Friday, December 16, 2011

A currency future(FX future)

currency future, also known as FX future, is a futures contract to exchange one currency for another at a specified date in the future at a price (exchange rate) that is fixed on the purchase date. In India, on NSE the price of a future contract is in terms of INR per unit of other currency e.g. US Dollars. Currency future contracts allow investors to hedge against foreign exchange risk. Currency Derivatives are available on four currency pairs viz. US Dollars (USD), Euro (EUR), Great Britain Pound (GBP) and Japanese Yen (JPY). Currency options are currently available on US Dollars.

 

NSE was the first exchange to have received an in-principle approval from SEBI for setting up currency derivative segment. The exchange launched its currency futures trading platform on 29th August, 2008. Currency futures on USD-INR were introduced for trading and subsequently the Indian rupee was allowed to trade against other currencies such as euro, pound sterling and the Japanese yen. Currency Options was introduced on October 29, 2010.

 

National Securities Clearing Corporation Limited (NSCCL) is the clearing and settlement agency for all deals executed on the Currency Derivatives segment. NSCCL acts as legal counter-party to all deals on NSE's Currency Derivatives segment and guarantees settlement.

A Clearing Member (CM) of NSCCL has the responsibility of clearing and settlement of all deals executed by Trading Members (TM) on NSE, who clear and settle such deals through them.

 

Settlement of daily mark to market is carried out on T+1 day basis.

Final Settlement is carried out on T+2day basis.


Members with a funds pay-in obligation are required to have clear funds in their primary clearing account on or before 8.30 a.m. on the settlement day. The payout of funds is credited to the primary clearing account of the members thereafter.

 

Daily Settlement Price for mark to market settlement of futures contracts

Daily settlement price for futures contracts is the closing price of such contracts on the trading day. The closing price for a futures contract shall be calculated on the basis of the last half an hour weighted average price of such contract or such other price as may be decided by the relevant authority from time to time.


Theoretical daily settlement price for unexpired futures contracts which are not traded during the last half an hour on a day


Theoretical daily settlement price for unexpired futures contracts, which are not traded during the last half an hour on a day, shall be the price computed as per the formula:

F0=S0 e(r-r) fT

where:

F0 = Theoretical futures price
S0 = Value of the underlying
r = Cost of financing (using continuously compounded interest rate)
rf = Foreign risk free interest rate
T = Time till expiration
e = 2.71828

Rate of interest (r) may be the relevant MIFOR rate or such other rate as may be specified by the Clearing Corporation from time to time.

Foreign risk free interest rate is the relevant LIBOR rate or such other rate as may be specified by the Clearing Corporation from time to time.

 

Final Settlement Price for mark to market settlement of futures contracts:

Final settlement price for a futures contract for the various currencies shall be as mentioned below, or as may be specified by the relevant authority from time to time.

 

USDINR

EURINR

GBPINR

JPYINR

Final settlement price

RBI reference rate

RBI reference rate

Exchange rate published by RBI in its Press Release captioned RBI reference Rate for US$ and Euro

Exchange rate published by RBI in its Press Release captioned RBI reference Rate for US$ and Euro

Settlement of futures contracts on currency

 

Daily Mark-to-Market Settlement

The position in the futures contracts for each member is marked-to-market to the daily settlement price of the futures contracts at the end of each trade day.

The profits/ losses are computed as the difference between the trade price or the previous day's settlement price, as the case may be, and the current day's settlement price. The CMs who have suffered a loss are required to pay the mark-to-market loss amount to NSCCL, which is passed on to the members who have made a profit. This is known as daily mark-to-market settlement.

Theoretical daily settlement price for unexpired futures contracts, which are not traded during the last half an hour on a day, is currently the price computed as per the formula.

After daily settlement, all the open positions are reset to the daily settlement price.

CMs are responsible to collect and settle the daily mark to market profits/losses incurred by the TMs and their clients clearing and settling through them. The pay-in and pay-out of the mark-to-market settlement is on T+1 day (T = Trade day). The mark to market losses or profits are directly debited or credited to the CMs clearing bank account.

 

Final Settlement

On the expiry of the futures contracts, NSCCL marks all positions of a CM to the final settlement price and the resulting profit / loss is settled in cash.

The final settlement profit / loss is computed as the difference between trade price or the previous day's settlement price, as the case may be, and the RBI reference rate of the such futures contract on the last trading day.

Final settlement loss/ profit amount is debited/ credited to the relevant CMs clearing bank account on T+2 day (T= last trading day).

Open positions in futures contracts cease to exist after their last trading day.

 

NSCCL has developed a comprehensive risk containment mechanism for the Currency derivatives segment. The most critical component of a risk containment mechanism for NSCCL is the online position monitoring and margining system. The actual margining and position monitoring is done on-line, on an intra-day basis. NSCCL uses the SPAN' (Standard Portfolio Analysis of Risk) system for the purpose of margining, which is a portfolio based system.


Initial Margin

NSCCL collects initial margin up-front for all the open positions of a CM based on the margins computed by NSCCL-SPAN'. A CM is in turn required to collect the initial margin from the TMs and his respective clients. Similarly, a TM is required to collect upfront margins from his clients.

Initial margin requirements are based on 99% value at risk over a one day time horizon. However, in the case of futures contracts, where it may not be possible to collect mark to market settlement value, before the commencement of trading on the next day, the initial margin is computed over a two-day time horizon, applying the appropriate statistical formula. The methodology for computation of Value at Risk percentage is as per the recommendations of SEBI from time to time.

Initial margin requirement for a member:

  • For client positions - is netted at the level of individual client and grossed across all clients, at the Trading/ Clearing Member level, without any setoffs between clients.
  • For proprietary positions - is netted at Trading/ Clearing Member level without any setoffs between client and proprietary positions.

For the purpose of SPAN Margin, various parameters are specified from time to time.

In case a trading member wishes to take additional trading positions his CM is required to provide Margin deposit to NSCCL. MD can be provided by the members in the form of Cash, Bank Guarantee, Fixed Deposit Receipts and approved securities & Government securities.


Extreme loss margin:

Clearing members are subject to extreme loss margins in addition to initial margins. The applicable extreme loss margin on the mark to market value of the gross open positions is as follows or as may be specified by the relevant authority from time to time.

USDINR

EURINR

GBPINR

JPYINR

1% of the value of gross open position

0.3% of the value of gross open position

0.5% of the value of gross open position

0.7% of the value of gross open position

 

Contract Specifications - FUTURES

 

Symbol

USDINR

EURINR

GBPINR

JPYINR

Market Type

N

N

N

N

Instrument Type

FUTCUR

FUTCUR

FUTCUR

FUTCUR

Unit of trading

1 - 1 unit denotes 1000 USD.

1 - 1 unit denotes 1000 EURO.

1 - 1 unit denotes 1000 POUND STERLING.

1 - 1 unit denotes 100000 JAPANESE YEN.

Underlying / Order Quotation

The exchange rate in Indian Rupees for US Dollars

The exchange rate in Indian Rupees for Euro.

The exchange rate in Indian Rupees for Pound Sterling.

The exchange rate in Indian Rupees for 100 Japanese Yen.

Tick size

0.25 paise  or INR 0.0025

Trading hours

Monday to Friday 
9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

Contract trading cycle

12 month trading cycle.

Last trading day

Two working days prior to the last business day of the expiry month at 12 noon.

Final settlement day

Last working day (excluding Saturdays) of the expiry month. 
The last working day will be the same as that for Interbank Settlements in Mumbai.

Quantity Freeze

10,001 or greater

Base price

Theoretical price on the 1st day of the contract.
On all other days, DSP of the contract.

Theoretical price on the 1st day of the contract.
On all other days, DSP of the contract.

Theoretical price on the 1st day of the contract.
On all other days, DSP of the contract.

Theoretical price on the 1st day of the contract.
On all other days, DSP of the contract.

Price operating range

Tenure upto 6 months

+/-3 % of base price.

Tenure greater than 6 months

+/- 5% of base price.

Position limits

Clients

higher of 6% of total open interest or USD 10 million

higher of 6% of total open interest or EURO 5 million

higher of 6% of total open interest or GBP 5 million

higher of 6% of total open interest or JPY 200 million

Trading Members

higher of 15% of the total open interest or USD 50 million

higher of 15% of the total open interest or EURO 25 million

higher of 15% of the total open interest or GBP 25 million

higher of 15% of the total open interest or JPY 1000 million

Banks

higher of 15% of the total open interest or USD 100 million

higher of 15% of the total open interest or EURO 50 million

higher of 15% of the total open interest or GBP 50 million

higher of 15% of the total open interest or JPY 2000 million

Initial margin

SPAN Based Margin

Extreme loss margin

1% of MTM value of gross open position

0.3% of MTM value of gross open position

0.5% of MTM value of gross open position

0.7% of MTM value of gross open position

Calendar spreads

Rs.400 for spread of 1 month
Rs.500 for spread of 2 months
Rs.800 for spread of 3 months 
Rs.1000 for spread of 4 months and more

Rs.700 for spread of 1 month
Rs.1000 for spread of 2 months
Rs.1500 for spread of 3 months and more

Rs.1500 for spread of 1 month
Rs.1800 for spread of 2 months
Rs.2000 for spread of 3 months and more

Rs.600 for spread of 1 month
Rs.1000 for spread of 2 months
Rs.1500 for spread of 3 months and more

Settlement

Daily settlement  :  T + 1 
Final  settlement :  T + 2

Mode of settlement

Cash settled in Indian Rupees

Daily settlement price
(DSP)

Calculated on the basis of the last half an hour weighted average price.

Final settlement price
(FSP)

 

Wednesday, December 7, 2011

THE LEVERAGED BUY OUT DEAL OF TATA & TETLEY


THE LEVERAGED BUY OUT DEAL OF TATA & TETLEY

The case 'The Leveraged Buyout Deal of Tata & Tetley' provides insights into the concept of Leveraged Buyout (LBO) and its use as a financial tool in acquisitions, with specific reference to Tata Tea's takeover of global tea major Tetley. This deal which was the biggest ever cross-border acquisition at that time, was also the first-ever successful leveraged buy-out by any Indian company. The case examines the Tata Tea-Tetley deal in detail, explaining the process and the structure of the deal. The case helps to understand the mechanism of LBO. Through the Tata-Tetley deal the case attempts to give an understanding of the practical application of the concept.

"We were very clear that the burden on Tata tea should be such that the company would be able to absorb it. And it would not materially affect Tata Tea's bottomline."

- N.A.Soonavala, Vice-Chairman, Tata Tea.

"It was important to make the right decision on the comprehensiveness of the transaction. The model has been driven by existing and future earnings potential of the Tetley group and the resultant post-acquisition cash flows to immediately justify the business and financial model."

- Rana Kapoor, MD, Rabo India Finance Ltd., Commenting on the deal.

 

Introduction

In the summer of 2000, the Indian corporate fraternity was witness to a path breaking achievement, never heard of or seen before in the history of corporate India.

In a landmark deal, heralding a new chapter in the Indian corporate history, Tata Tea acquired the UK heavyweight brand Tetley for a staggering 271 million pounds. This deal which happened to be the largest cross-border acquisition by any Indian company at that time marked the culmination of Tata Tea's strategy of pushing for aggressive growth and worldwide expansion. 

The acquisition of Tetley pitch forked Tata Tea into a position where it could rub shoulders with global behemoths like Unilever and Lawrie. The acquisition of Tetley made Tata Tea the second biggest tea company in the world. (The first being Unilever, owner of Brooke Bond and Lipton).

Moreover it also went through a metamorphosis from a plantation company to an international consumer products company.

Ratan Tata, Chairman, Tata group said, "It is a great signal for global industry by Indian Industry. It is a momentous occasion as an Indian company has been able to acquire a brand and an overseas company." Apart from the size of the deal, what made it particularly special was the fact that it was the first ever leveraged buy-out (LBO) by any Indian company. This method of financing had never been successfully attempted before by any Indian company. Tetley's price tag of 271 mn pounds (US $450 m) was more than four times the net worth of Tata tea which stood at US $ 114 m. This David & Goliath aspect was what made the entire transaction so unusual. What made it possible was the financing mechanism of LBO. This mechanism allowed the acquirer (Tata Tea) to minimise its cash outlay in making the purchase.

The Tale of Tata Tea


Tata Tea was incorporated in 1962 as Tata Finlay Limited, and commenced business in 1963. The company, in collaboration with Tata Finlay & Company, Glasgow, UK, initially set up an instant tea factory at Munnar (Kerala) and a blending/packaging unit in Bangalore.

Over the years, the company expanded its operations and also acquired tea plantations. In 1976, the company acquired Sterling Tea companies from James Finlay & Company for Rs 115 million, using Rs 19.8 million of equity and Rs. 95.2 million of unsecured loans at 5% per annum interest. In 1982, Tata Industries Limited bought out the entire stake of James Finlay & Company in the joint venture, Tata Finlay Ltd. In 1983, the company was renamed Tata Tea Limited. In the mid 1980s, to offset the erratic fluctuations in commodity prices, Tata Tea felt it necessary to enter the branded tea market. In May 1984, the company revolutionized the value-added tea market in India by launching Kanan Devan tea in polypack.

In 1984, the company set up a research and development center at Munnar, Kerala. In 1986, it launched Tata Tea Dust in Maharashtra. In 1988, the Tata Tea Leaf was launched in Madhya Pradesh.

In 1989, Tata Tea bought a 52% stake in Karnataka-based Consolidated Coffee Limited-the largest coffee plantation in Asia, in order to expand its coffee business. In 1991, Tata Tea formed a joint venture with Tetley International, UK, to market its branded tea abroad. In 1992, Tata Tea took a 9.5% stake in Asian Coffee-the Hyderabad based 100% export oriented unit known for its instant coffee, through an open offer. This offer was the first of its kind in Indian corporate history. Later, in 1994, Tata Tea increased its stake in Asian Coffee to 64.5% through another open offer. This helped it to consolidate its position in the coffee industry. In 1995, Tata Tea unveiled a massive physical upgradation program at a cost of Rs 1.6 billion. The upgradation program, spread over four years, was meant to improve its production facilities. In the same year, the company, along with a Sri Lankan partner, bid successfully for a group of 20 tea estates in the famous Watawala plantations in Sri Lanka.

In 1996, Tata Tea felt the need to develop into a truly national brand. It identified an opportunity to enter the leaf tea segment in the South. Between 1996 and 1998, the company launched Tata Tea Premium in Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and Goa.

In December 1999, Kanan Devan was relaunched in Kerala in an entirely new pack along with a fresh advertisement campaign.  The company also planned to relaunch Kanan Devan in other markets. The new pack, with the revamped Tata logo, incorporated modern graphics with bolder branding whilst retaining the core properties associated with the brand.  The back panels on the pack were also made more interactive and informative.

To meet the demands of the American market, Tata Tea Inc. - a wholly owned subsidiary of Tata Tea  Limited  -  was  set  up  in  Florida  to  package  and  market  instant  tea  in  the  US.  The  tea  was produced  in  Tata  Tea's  factory  in  Munnar  and  then  processed  in  Florida.  The company also launched Snapple, a ready-to-drink iced tea, in the US. In 2000, it was one of the largest selling ready-to-drink teas in the US.

In  order  to  tap  the  Japanese  tea  and  coffee  market,  Tata  Tea  entered  into  a  joint  venture  with Hitachi of Japan - Tata Hitachi Sales Limited. Tata Tea had been serving as an agent for Nippon Yusen Kaisha (NYK), one of the largest shipping companies in the world. In the mid 1990s, the company  formed  a  joint  venture,  Tata  NYK,  which  aimed  at  playing  a  major  role  in  transport operations and management of seaports, inland container depots, and container freight stations.


De-Mystifying LBO

The Tata-Tetley deal was rather unusual, in that it had no precedence in India. Traditionally, Indian market had preferred cash deals, be it the Rs.10.08 billion takeover of Indal by Hindalco or the Rs. 4.99 billion acquisition of Indiaworld by Satyam.

What set the deal apart was the LBO mechanism which financed the acquisition.



LBO is defined as "acquisition of a company, financed by the borrowing of all the stocks or assets of a public limited company by a small group of investors. This buying may be sponsored by buy-out specialists  or  investment  bankers  that  arrange  such  deals  and  usually  includes  representation  by incumbent management".

Typically the buying group forms a shell corporation to act as a legal entity making the acquisition. In the stock purchase format, the target shareholders simply sell their stock and all interest in the Target Corporation to the buying group and then the two firms may be merged. In the asset-purchase format, the Target Corporation sells its assets to the buying group. The original shareholders own the target organisation,  now  merely  a  pool  of  cash  to  make  investments  with  no  tangible  assets;  the  target corporation  issues  a  liquidating  dividend  to  its  shareholders  or  becomes  an  investment  company, using  the  pool  of  cash  to  make  investments,  whose  proceeds  are  distributed  to  the  shareholders.

Sometimes the management is the prime moving force in this process; then it is called management buy-out (MBO).

In an LBO, debt financing typically represents 50% of the purchase price. The debt is secured by the assets of the acquired firm and is usually amortized over a period of less than ten years. As funds are generated by operations or from sale of assets of the acquired firm, the debt to be paid off is to be scheduled.  The  sale  of  assets  occurs  when  the  investor  group  is  motivated  to  take  control  in  part because of what it considers unwise or ill-judged acquisitions by the firm in the past.

There may also be limited equity participation on the part of outside investors such as pension funds and insurance companies, often with the provision that the equity interest will be repurchased after a pre-determined period to provide a specific yield. Following completion of the buy-out, the acquired company is usually run as a privately-held corporation rather than a public corporation, at least for a period of time, after which resale of the firm at a profit is anticipated.

  

The LBO seemed to have inherent advantages over cash transactions. In an LBO, the acquiring company could float a Special Purpose vehicle (SPV) which was a 100% subsidiary of the acquirer with a minimum equity capital. 

The SPV leveraged this equity to gear up significantly higher debt to buyout the target company. This debt was paid off by the SPV through the target company's own cash flows. The target company's assets were pledged with the lending institution and once the debt was redeemed, the acquiring company had the option to merge with the SPV. Thus the liability of the acquiring company was limited to its equity holding in the SPV. Thus, in an LBO, the takeover was financed by the target company's future internal accruals.  This reduced the burden on the acquiring company's balance sheet and made the entire takeover a low risk affair.

In the case of Tata Tea, its reserves at the time of the deal were just around Rs 4 billion, precluding the possibility of making such a gigantic acquisition on its own. Neither could it afford the debt burden associated with large borrowings. So, it opted for a leveraged buyout.

The deal was so structured, that although Tata tea retained full control over the venture, the debt portion of the deal did not affect its balance sheet. The liability of acquisition was limited to Tata Tea's equity contribution to the SPV. Also, the lenders had no recourse at all to Tata Tea in India.

Its dilutive impact on Tata Tea's earnings was also not substantial. One expert described it as "a classic leveraged buyout of cross-border finance, without recourse to Tata tea, secured solely upon Tetley's assets and cash flow". Interestingly, in the case of Tata Tea the deal helped satisfy it, two major requirements of financing, minimum exposure for Tata Tea but at the same time retaining 100% ownership of the company, a seemingly win-win deal indeed.


Structure of the Deal

The purchase of Tetley was funded by a combination of equity, subscribed by Tata tea, junior loan stock subscribed by institutional investors (including the vendor institutions Mezzanine Finance, arranged by Intermediate Capital Group Plc.) and senior debt facilities arranged and underwritten by Rabobank International.

Tata Tea created a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)-christened Tata Tea (Great Britain) to acquire all the properties of Tetley. The SPV was capitalised at 70 mn pounds, of which Tata tea contributed 60 mn pounds; this included 45 mn pounds raised through a GDR issue. The US subsidiary of the company, Tata Tea Inc. had contributed the balance 10 mn pounds. 

The SPV leveraged the 70 mn pounds equity 3.36 times to raise a debt of 235 mn pounds, to finance the deal (Refer FIGURE I). The entire debt amount of 235 mn pounds comprised 4 tranches (A, B, C and D) whose tenure varied from 7 years to 9.5 years, with a coupon rate of around 11% which was 424 basis points above LIBOR.

Of  this,  the  Netherlands  based  Rabobank  had  provided  215  mn  pounds,  while venture capital funds, Mezzanine and Shroders contributed 10 mn pounds each While A, B, and C were senior term loans, trench D was a revolving loan that took the form of recurring advances and letters of credit. Of the four tranches A and B were meant for funding the acquisition, while C and D  were  meant  for  capital  expenditure  and  working  capital  requirements  respectively (Refer TABLE 1).

The debt was raised against Tetley's brands and physical assets.  The  valuation  of  the  deal  was done  on  the  basis  of  future  cash  flows  that  the  brand  was  expected  to  generate  along  with  the synergies arising out of the acquisition.

FIGURE I

STRUCTURE OF TATA TEA'S LBO DEAL


Though the actual cost of the Tetley takeover was 271 mn pounds, Tata Tea spent another 9 mn pounds on legal, banking and advisory services and a further 25 mn pounds for Tetley's working capital requirements and additional funding plans, thereby swelling the total acquisition cost to 305 mn pounds. Since the entire securitization was based on Tetley's operations, Tata Tea's exposure was  limited  to  the  equity  component  of  only  70  mn  pounds.  Thus effectively, for just 70 mn pounds equity exposure, Tata Tea was acquiring a 264 mn pounds company.

The Way to Go?

Some analysts felt that Tata Tea's decision to acquire Tetley through a LBO was not all that beneficial for shareholders. They pointed out that though there would be an immediate dilution of equity (after the GDR issue), Tata Tea would not earn revenues on account of this investment in the near future (as an immediate merger is not planned). This would lead to a dilution in earnings and also a reduction in the return on equity. The shareholders would, thus have to bear the burden of the investment without any immediate benefits in terms of enhanced revenues and profits. From the lenders point of view too there seemed to be some drawbacks. Because of the large amount of debt  relative  to  the  equity  in  the  new  corporation,  the  bonds  were  typically  rated  below  the investment grade.

LBO  as  a  concept  did  not  seem  to  have  found  wide  acceptance  in  the  Indian  financial  system. Given  the  high  rates  of  interest  in  the  country,  such  debt  did  not  seem  to  be  forthcoming, especially since banks and financial institutions seemed interested in deploying their funds in high- return investments rather than in an LBO. Also a deal of this sort required the acquiring company's SPV to be leveraged to a far higher extent than the generally acceptable level of 1:1 to 1:2 debt- equity ratio which Indian banks and financial institutions were comfortable with.  However, inspite of  all  the  odds,  Tata  Tea's  acquisition  of  Tetley  seemed  to  have  set  a  new  benchmark  in  the corporate  Indian  history  of  cross-border  acquisitions.  It  seemed  to  have  generated  considerable interest  and  appreciation  of  the  concept,  as  a  viable  alternative  in  Indian  corporate  circles.  It remained to be seen how many would follow this new path, nuptials of the leveraged kind.

Important Notes and Terms

Tetley was the second largest brand of packaged tea in the global market, behind Unilever's Brooke Bond and Lipton brands.

The Lectic Law library's Lexicon defines a leverage buyout as "a mechanism under which a company is acquired by a person or entity using the value of the company's assets to finance its acquisition. This allows (for) the acquirer to minimise its outlay of cash in making a purchase."

Brand of Tata Tea that was very popular especially in South Indian markets. The Kanan Devan variety went back over a century and was derived from the tea growing in the Kanan Devan Hills (Tata Tea had tea estates on these hills) located in the eastern part of central Kerala and adjoining parts of Tamil Nadu. The Kanan Devan name was used for decades for selling bulk teas originating from these hills, and this led to a loose tea franchise in southern India, particularly Kerala. With the growth in the branded tea segment, Tata Tea leveraged on the name Kanan Devan to convert this loose tea franchise into a brand so as to move up the value chain.

An SPV is a company floated to act as the holding company for the purpose of acquisition in an LBO. The company is created with an equity base and this equity is leveraged along with the assets of the acquired company to fund the acquisition.

Rana Kapoor, MD, Rabo India Finance Ltd.

Tata Tea raised 45 mn pounds from 7.6 million GDR's issued at $9.87 each, in March 2000.

LIBOR  is  an  abbreviation  for  "London  Interbank  Offered  Rate,"  and  is  the  interest  rate  offered  by  a specific group of London banks for U.S. dollar deposits of a stated maturity. LIBOR is the base interest rate paid on deposits between banks in the Eurodollar market (A Eurodollar is a dollar deposited in a bank in a country where the currency is not the dollar).  It exists for various currencies and for different maturities.

 

 


Monday, December 5, 2011

Asia Faces ‘Much Greater’ Global Risks: ADB


Asian economies are facing "much greater downside risks" now because of the possibility of a recession in the U.S. and Europe and the threat of destabilizing capital flows, the Asian Development Bank said.

The biggest challenge for policy makers in emerging East Asian nations is to safeguard growth against the threat of another global economic crisis, the Manila-based lender said in its Asia Economic Monitor report today. Uncertainty over the world economy means officials in the region must have "sufficient flexibility" to adjust policies quickly, it said.

"The cautiously optimistic outlook for emerging East Asia is subject to much greater downside risks now than just a few months ago," the ADB said. "The global economic recovery could flounder if the euro zone and the US fall back into recession, causing another global financial crisis. Large and destabilizing capital flows could complicate the region's macroeconomic management and jeopardize economic growth."

Asian policy makers have shifted their focus to shielding growth, rather than stemming inflation, as Europe's debt woes and a struggling U.S. economy increase the risk of another global recession. Indonesia and Thailand cut interest rates last month, while the Philippines in October unveiled a fiscal stimulus package to spur the economy.

Emerging East Asian economies may grow 7.2 percent next year after expanding 7.5 percent in 2011, according to the report today. That's lower than the lender's September forecast for 7.6 percent growth this year and 7.5 percent in 2012, it said.

Slower Growth

"Despite the weaker external environment, robust growth should continue into next year -- though at a slower pace," the ADB said.

Asian stocks and currencies have retreated amid concern that the region's export-reliant economies will suffer the impact of diminished global demand as the euro region struggles to stem its debt crisis. The MSCI Asia-Pacific Index (MXAP) fell about 16 percent last quarter, the biggest drop since the last three months of 2008.

"The lingering eurozone debt crisis could boost risk aversion among investors, with rapid swings in risk appetite boosting capital flow volatility beyond the spurts and stops seen in the third quarter this year," the ADB said. "Consequently, exchange rate volatility would follow from large but fickle capital movements."

Emerging East Asia won't be immune to a "major" slowdown in advanced economies, which would hurt the region's economic growth and pose "significant" policy challenges, the ADB said.

"With the euro zone's sovereign debt crisis unfolding and risks of faltering global recovery rising, macroeconomic policy must remain cautious and prudent," it said. "Should the euro zone fall into a full-blown financial and economic crisis, emerging East Asian economies must respond promptly, decisively, and collectively."


Sunday, December 4, 2011

American Airlines files for bankruptcy

American Airlines filed for bankruptcy protection on Tuesday to cut labor costs in the face of high fuel prices and dampened travel demand, capping a prolonged descent for what was once the largest U.S. carrier.

AMR Corp, the parent of American Airlines, also filed for bankruptcy and replaced its chief executive.

The company, which employs about 88,000, has been mired for years in fruitless union negotiations, complaining that it shoulders higher labor costs than rival domestic and foreign carriers that have already restructured in bankruptcy.

United Continental Holdings Inc's United Airlines and Delta Air Lines Inc, both of which used Chapter 11 to cut costs and later found merger partners, are now the largest U.S. carriers. American ranks third.

"The world changed around us," incoming Chief Executive Tom Horton told reporters on a conference call. "It became increasingly clear that the cost gap between us and our competitors was untenable."

AMR named Horton as chairman and chief executive, replacing Gerard Arpey, who retired.

American plans to operate normally while in bankruptcy, but the Chapter 11 filing could punch a hole in the pensions of roughly 130,000 workers and retirees.

AMR pension plans are $10 billion short of what the carrier owes, and any default could be the largest in U.S. history, government pension insurers estimated.

Ray Neidl, aerospace analyst at Maxim Group, said a lack of progress in contract talks with pilots tipped the carrier into Chapter 11, though it has enough cash to operate. The carrier's passenger planes average 3,000 daily U.S. departures.

"They were proactive," Neidl said. "They should have adequate cash reserves to get through this."

PROBLEMS TO ADDRESS

Bankruptcy gives AMR a chance to pare less profitable operations, and could result in the sale of flight routes. The process also gives AMR more flexibility, according to Jack Williams, a professor of law at Georgia State University.

"There are considerable tax benefits that they will be able to use in a bankruptcy case, and they will be able to more aggressively manage their liabilities," Williams said.

But analysts question whether the bankruptcy will address operational shortcomings that have eroded revenue.

"Bankruptcy is not necessarily the be-all, end-all," said Helane Becker, an analyst with Dahlman Rose & Co. "They've got more problems to address in addition to the cost problem."

Shares of AMR closed Tuesday down $1.36, or 84 percent, at 26 cents, down from a 52-week high of $8.89 on January 7. Stock typically is wiped out in bankruptcy.

Shares of rival airlines rallied on expectations that reduced competition could boost fares. AMR had kept a lid on industrywide fares in its effort to keep its airplanes full.

United Continental shares closed up 6.3 percent at $17.63, Delta rose 5 percent to $7.80 and US Airways Group Inc climbed 4.4 percent to $4.46.

AMR shares were halted 28 times on the NYSE on Tuesday for triggering a circuit breaker rule, activated when a stock moves up or down at least 10 percent within five minutes.

SLIMMED-DOWN AMR

In its bankruptcy petition filed in Manhattan, AMR reported assets of $24.72 billion and liabilities of $29.55 billion. The company has $4.1 billion in cash.

One bankruptcy rule is "don't wait too long," Harvey Miller, a partner at Weil, Gotshal & Manges representing AMR, said at a court hearing. "Don't wait until the course is irreversible. That is what American Airlines is doing today."

AMR's bankruptcy filing showed few details about how the company would proceed, said Stephen Selbst, a bankruptcy attorney with Herrick Feinstein in New York.

"It's possible they are still in negotiations and don't want to put something on paper that might prejudice those negotiations," he said.

Experts believe AMR stands to save billions by restructuring its obligations in bankruptcy.

"AMR will no longer have its defined benefit pension plan, helping absorb nearly $7 billion in debt," Morningstar equity analyst Basili Alukos said.

"I imagine the company can save between $1.2 billion to $1.5 billion in labor costs, in addition to savings on repair and maintenance and better fuel burn," he said.

MERGER IN THE OFFING?

AMR said the bankruptcy has no direct legal impact on non-U.S. operations. It also said it was not considering debtor-in-possession financing.

But it could susceptible to unsolicited takeover bids from rival carriers. AMR has long said it could thrive on its own.

Robert Herbst, an analyst with AirlineFinancials.com and a former American pilot, said there was a "95 percent" chance American would join up with another carrier within two years.

"US Airways is probably toward the top of the list but it wouldn't be the only (potential merger partner)," he said.

A US Airways representative did not immediately return a phone call seeking comment.

Most large U.S. carriers are the products of mergers.

United Continental combined the former United Airlines and Continental Airlines, while Delta bought the former Northwest Airlines. US Airways was formed from a 2005 merger with America West Airlines.

US Airways and United Airlines filed for bankruptcy protection in 2002, and Delta and Northwest in 2005. US Airways had tried to buy Delta out of bankruptcy.

Japan Airlines Co, one of American Airlines' alliance partners, filed for bankruptcy last year.

American Airlines said it would remain an active member of the oneworld global airline alliance.

LABOR PAIN

American struggled with labor costs despite massive concessions from unionized workers in 2003, which enabled it to avoid Chapter 11 at the time.

"That deal wasn't good enough," former American chief Robert Crandall told Reuters. "The other airlines that went bankrupt cut their costs much deeper than American.

"If you look at all of the elements of the problem, they all stem back to costs," he said. "It hasn't cut capacity effectively given the constraints" that labor placed.

Contract talks with pilots hit a wall in recent weeks over wages, benefits and work rules. Talks with unionized flight attendants have also flagged.

"While today's news was not entirely unexpected, it is nevertheless disappointing that we find ourselves working for an airline that has lost its way," David Bates, president of the Allied Pilots Association, said in a statement.

A wave of pilot retirements this year prompted speculation of a Chapter 11 filing, given that the retirements could preserve pensions that might be at risk of being terminated.

"The 18-month timeline allotted for restructuring will almost certainly involve significant changes to the airline's business plan and to our contract," Bates said.

Fitch warns of U.S. downgrade if no budget deal in 2013

Fitch Ratings gave the United States until 2013 to come up with a "credible plan" to tackle its ballooning budget deficit or risk a downgrade of the country's coveted AAA rating.

The ratings agency on Monday revised to negative from stable the outlook on the U.S. credit rating after a special congressional committee failed last week to agree on at least $1.2 trillion in deficit-reduction measures.

The committee failure made it unlikely that any meaningful deficit plan will be adopted next year, increasing the fiscal burden on the next administration that will be elected in late 2012, Fitch said.

"The negative outlook reflects Fitch's declining confidence that timely fiscal measures necessary to place U.S. public finances on a sustainable path and secure the U.S. AAA sovereign rating will be forthcoming," the ratings agency said in a statement, adding that the chance of a downgrade is "slightly greater than 50 percent" now.

The news had little market impact, as a negative outlook from Fitch was widely expected.

"What it shows is that Fitch is putting the U.S. on warning that this cannot go on forever," said Michael Yoshikami, chief investment strategist at YCMNET Advisors in Walnut Creek, California.

"The markets already assumed this was going to happen. It would be different if it was a downgrade but a negative outlook is not the end of the world."

Like Moody's Investors Service, which also has a negative outlook on the U.S. Aaa rating, Fitch does not expect meaningful deficit-reduction measures in 2012, when presidential elections should exacerbate political divisions in Washington.

Rival agency Standard & Poor's cut the U.S. rating to AA-plus in an unprecedented decision on Aug. 5, citing concerns about the government's budget deficit and rising debt burden. It maintains a negative outlook on the credit.

KICKING THE CAN

The so-called "Super Committee" of six Democrats and six Republicans was seen by Fitch as the last chance of an agreement before elections.

Last week, however, its members announced they were unable to agree on a deficit reduction plan, setting in motion automatic cuts worth $1.2 trillion over 10 years. The cuts are designed to be split evenly between domestic and military programs.

Both S&P and Moody's said on Nov. 21 the committee's failure would have no immediate impact on their ratings.

However, Moody's on Nov. 23 warned the United States that its rating could be in jeopardy if lawmakers backtrack on the automatic cuts of $1.2 trillion due to take effect starting in 2013.

In a statement issued after Fitch's decision, the U.S. Treasury said "Fitch's action is a reminder of the need for Congress to reduce the country's long-term deficit in a balanced manner and to avoid efforts that would undo the $1.2 trillion in automatic cuts negotiated last summer."

Fitch is now willing to give the new government that will take office in January 2013 several months to come up with a "sound" deficit reduction plan, top credit analyst David Riley told Reuters in an interview.

"Once we move to the second half (of 2013) and it looks as if a deal can't be done, then the (negative) outlook would likely result in a downgrade," Riley said.

Until then, there is little change of a "material adverse shock" that would trigger an early downgrade of the U.S. rating, he said, playing down concerns about the economic impact of the euro-zone debt crisis.

"If we had a relatively short downturn because, for example, the crisis in Europe got much worse and there was a spillover effect to the U.S. but we thought that it ultimately would prove to be temporary for the U.S. then that wouldn't necessarily lead us to change the rating."