Sunday, August 28, 2011

Launch of derivatives contracts on the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the S&P 500 indices

Beginning Monday, Indian investors will be able to trade in derivatives contracts on the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the S&P 500 indices right here in the country, paying in rupee. The National Stock Exchange (NSE), the biggest stock exchange in India by turnover, will launch derivatives contracts on these two indices.

This is the first time that derivatives contracts on these two indices will be traded on any exchange outside of US, a statement from NSE said.

"Derivative contracts on these global indices will provide Indian investors easy access to the US markets in Indian market hours, without taking any currency risk," Ravi Narain, MD & CEO, NSE, said. While, NSE will launch futures contracts on both the Dow Jones and the S&P 500 indices, options contracts will be available only on the S&P 500 index. The Dow Jones index constitutes stocks of 30 of the largest listed US companies while the S&P 500 tracks 500 leading US stocks listed on NYSE and Nasdaq exchanges. Globally, these two indices are among the most tracked stock market benchmarks.

Derivatives: Momentum Selling May Continue, While The Market Appears Oversold



Bearish positions continues to be build, but market to take cues from global market trend while RBI's move to tame inflation will have to be closely watched

S&P nifty & nifty future and Futures & Option segment volumes


Source: NSE
Following some pull back during the initial part of the week for the nifty due to short covering, the market tumbled during the end three days as the fresh shorts were created during the expiry day. On Friday however it was all round selling both in the cash as well as the futures & option (F&O) segment. The nifty September future series added significant short position while some of the stock futures shed long positions on Friday.
Worries about introduction of QE3 in US and the domestic inflation and economic slow down concern weighed heavily on the domestic bourses as the Foreign Institutional Investors continued to dump Indian Equities. Interest rate sensitive sectors like Bank, Auto, Construction & Real Estate, Metals and capital goods segment saw sharp sell off. Perhaps the fears of sharp earnings downgrade for the front line players by major institutions caused the major sell off. Overall for the week the nifty fell 97.85 points to close at 4747.80.On Friday itself the nifty corrected 91.80 points. The nifty September future series on Friday added 26.21 lakh shares to take its total OI to 2.42 crore shares. The nifty September future on the other hand closed at a marginal premium of 0.9 points at 4748.70 on Friday.
In the futures and option (F&O) segment it was absolutely bear signals as fresh shorts were created in the index futures, while some of the long positions in the stock future segment were aggressively covered. Out-of-the-money strike call options witnessed aggressive writing, while out-of-the-money put strikes witnessed aggressive buying indicating the bearish mood. On Friday the nifty September future added 26.21 lakh shares in OI, to take the total OI to 2.42 crore shares.
The average volume in the F&O segment during the week was higher at Rs 168037 crore as compared to Rs 149006 crore during the previous week. Although the fundamentals still appears weak for the market in the medium term, there could be some pull back due to short covering as the market appears significantly oversold.
F&O segment-wise volume analysis
Source: NSE
The index put-call ratio on Friday increased sharply to 1.25 as compared to 1.05 the previous day, while the stock put-call ratio fell marginally to 0.54 as compared to 0.55 the previous day. The overall put-call ratio on Friday increased sharply to 1.21 as compared to 1.03 the previous day.
Open Interest (OI) break-up as on 26th August 2011
Open Interest (OI)* Change**Change#
Market wide 202.898.55-70.16
Index Future2.770.29-0.29
Stock Future173.50-0.33-31.40
Index Options12.001.96-5.51
Stock options14.626.62-32.96
* No of shares in crore
** Change is vis-à-vis previous day
# Change is vis-à-vis previous week
Source: NSE
The market-wide OI on Friday stood at 202.89 crore shares, 8.55 crore shares higher than the previous day. The index futures and Stock option segment added significant OI during the week. (See the OI break-up table)
Most active Nifty options (September 2011 series)

Most active Nifty options (September 2011 series)
OI
Call
Nifty 4600918050
Nifty 47001340650
Nifty 48002529900
Nifty 50005346600
Put
Nifty 44003071250
Nifty 45004139650
Nifty 46005199000
Nifty 47005119750
Source: NSE
The nifty 5000 and below strike call option of the September series added significant OI due to aggressive writing, while most of the out-of-the-money put strikes witnessed aggressive buying. The 5000-strike call option added 14.26 lakh shares in OI due to writing, to take its total OI to 53.47 lakh shares.
The 4600, 4700 and 4800 strike call option added 7.94 lakh shares, 6.24 lakh shares and 9.12 lakh shares in OI, to take their respective total OI to 9.18 lakh shares, 13.41 lakh shares and 25.30 lakh shares respectively indicating bearish positions. The 4400, 4500 and 4600 strike put option added OI of 14.12 lakh shares, 13.64 lakh shares and 10.30 lakh shares in OI due to buying. The total OI of these three strikes increased to 30.71 lakh shares, 41.40 lakh shares and 51.99 lakh shares respectively. (See the most active nifty option table)
Open Interest (OI) of major September 2011 series stock futures as on 26th August 2011
Open Interest (OI)* Change**Change#
Reliance 1.630.021.35
Tata Motors0.70-0.020.52
RCOM2.39-0.071.60
SBIN0.490.010.40
Tata Steel1.530.021.08
* No of shares in crore
** Change is vis-à-vis previous day
# Change is vis-à-vis previous week
Source: NSE
Top 10 Open Interest (OI) gainers in September 2011 series stock futures on 26th August 2011
Scrip Name OI*Change*% Change
COALINDIA320200080700034
INDIANB79000011900018
OPTOCIRCUI89600012100016
ABAN205100024400014
ORIENTBANK6470007600013
UNIONBANK193600020300012
JUBLFOOD3475003325011
BHUSANSTL5775005300010
BANKINDIA286500025650010
GMDCLTD4340003800010
* No of shares
Source: NSE
Top 10 Open Interest (OI) losers in September 2011 series stock futures on 26th August 2011
Scrip NameOI* Change*% Change
CHAMBLFERT3152000-888000-22
ESCORTS3994000-626000-14
RELCAPITAL3757000-574500-13
HINDPETRO3687000-518000-12
GSPL3892000-368000-9
BPCL921000-85500-8
BOMDYEING429000-35000-8
DHANBANK1072000-82000-7
BHARTIARTL8614000-622000-7
IDEA10976000-688000-6
* No of shares
Source: NSE
The momentum selling appears to continue for some more time, while there could be sharp pull back due to short covering as the market appears significantly oversold. The global market trend will remain the cue, while domestically the RBI's move to tame inflation will have to be closely watched. 

Saturday, August 27, 2011

A world of debt

Every human being on earth currently carries a debt burden of nearly $22,733 on average, if the latest reports are to be believed.

Every child is sharing the same debt burden at birth, as debt growth rates beat the global population growth rate. In fact, debt liabilities are growing faster than GDP expansion rates.

Overall outstanding debt worldwide has more than doubled in the past ten years to $158 trillion (Dh580 trillion) in 2010, up from $78 trillion in 2000, according to a recent report by global consultancy McKinsey.

The global population is currently estimated at 6.95 billion, whereas worldwide gross domestic product (GDP) reached $74.54 trillion last year.

This translates to a per capita GDP of $10,500, which is less than half of the per capita debt burden of $22,733.

In theory, this makes the human population a 'bankrupt' race and financially the most dangerously exposed and vulnerable in its history.

If you think this is bad, then wait for the worst news: The debt toll is rising and it will be higher next year.

The global debt trap

The global debt of $158 trillion includes $41.1 trillion incurred by governments worldwide up to last year, accounting for 69 per cent of global GDP. This is expected to rise to $46.12 trillion in 2012, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU).

"Debt also grew faster than GDP over this period, with the ratio of global debt to world GDP increasing from 218 per cent in 2000 to 266 per cent in 2010," McKinsey said.

Around $48 trillion of the total debt outstanding was that of governments and financial institutions. In both the US and Western Europe in 2010, the ratio of public debt stood at more than 70 per cent of the GDP, McKinsey said.

"Developed countries may need to undergo years of spending cuts and higher taxes in order to get their fiscal houses in order," it added.

Many governments in the developed world have resorted to massive stimulus measures to bolster their economies since the 2008 global financial meltdown.

"Public debt outstanding [measured as marketable government debt securities] stood at $41.1 trillion at the end of 2010, an increase of nearly $25 trillion since 2000. This was equivalent to 69 per cent of global GDP, or 23 percentage points higher than in 2000. In just the past two years, public debt has grown by $9.4 trillion — or 13 percentage points of GDP," McKinsey said.

The government debt worldwide was $31.7 trillion in 2008. Last year alone, government debt accounted for about 80 per cent of the overall growth in total outstanding debt.

World governments owe the money to their own citizens and lenders. The rising total debt is important for two reasons.

First, when debt rises faster than economic output (as it has been doing in recent years), higher government debt implies more state interference in the economy and higher taxes in the future, EIU explains in its global debt clock — which is ticking every second.

"Second, debt must be rolled over at regular intervals. This creates a recurring popularity test for individual governments, rather as reality TV show contestants face a public phone vote every week," it says.

"Fail that vote, as the Greek government did in early 2010, and the country can be plunged into imminent crisis. So the higher the global government debt total, the greater the risk of fiscal crisis, and the bigger the economic impact such crises will have."

Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, the UK and the US are caught in a debt trap. For some governments, the only escape is to do the same things that an average household must do when it can't make ends meet — sell off assets, slash spending, scrape for extra earnings, downsize, and make sacrifices.

They are cutting healthcare and pensions for millions of citizens, laying off hundreds of thousands of government employees, or worse. For others, like the US, the primary response so far has been to run the money printing presses — all with untold consequences.

The national debt of the United States — the world's biggest economy — reached $14.62 trillion in recent months — close to its GDP.

According to the IMF, US public debt will reach 99 per cent of its $14.65 trillion GDP in 2011 and 103 per cent in 2012.

In the United States, debt per citizen is more than double the global average, standing at $46,884, while its burden per taxpayer has reached a whopping $130,662 — according to US Debt Clock.

Born into debt

"Every American born today owes $46,884 to the federal government the day she or he is born. And we are transferring a tremendous amount of debt to the new generation, much of it owed to overseas creditors who expect to be repaid by our children with interest," US Senator Mark Kirk said recently.

The latest push to raise America's debt limit of $14.29 trillion by $2.4 trillion earlier this month that placed the country's policymakers in direct confrontation with opposition politicians — is another example of how difficult things could become. By August 2, a possible US default was creating a worldwide panic.

But how did all this happen?

The US Treasury has borrowed trillions of dollars over the past decade, much of it from foreign investors, to help finance two long wars, rescue its financial system, and promote economic growth through fiscal stimulus.

"The government must be able to issue new debt as long as it continues to run a budget deficit — the current shortfall is about $125 billion per month," Jonathan Masters, Associate Staff Writer, of Council on Foreign Relations, says. The debt limit was instituted with the Second Liberty Bond Act of 1917, and Congress has raised the cap 74 times since 1962.

"It took the first 204 years of our nation's history to accumulate $1 trillion in debt. And now we are doing that every two or three years," Jim Cooper, US Congressman, said.

The Budget Control Act of 2011 of the US now allows up to a $2.4 trillion rise in the debt ceiling (in three tranches), and immediately institutes ten-year discretionary spending caps totalling nearly $1 trillion.

Eurozone — the trouble zone

"In recent months the major areas of uncertainty for the global economy have revolved around the crisis in the Eurozone, the future path of monetary and fiscal policy in the United States, and the fight against inflation in emerging markets," says Ira Kalish, Director of Global Economics, Deloitte Research. "Failure to resolve these issues will have a negative impact on global growth and stability."

In its report, Deloitte Research says, despite the problems in the housing market and sovereign debt in Europe, the case for growth in the United States seems to be more compelling at the moment.

"As for Europe, recovery will depend on implementing a permanent solution to the debt crisis. Lowering inflation and steadily increasing average earnings will be key to recovery in the United Kingdom," it says.

The authorities in Europe and the US must focus on radical structural reform that brings hope to the markets that the debt situation is being seriously tackled, feels Gary Dugan, chief investment officer for Private Banking at Emirates NBD.

"Investors now recognise the Eurozone is at the epicentre of the world's fears. As the dust settles on problems in the United States [at least for the moment] investors have come to recognise the Eurozone as the weakest link in the global economy," Dugan says.

"Whilst the United States faces its own problems as an integrated economy it has the ability to address its problems far quicker than the Eurozone. In Europe it is incumbent upon each government to address its problems separately with only mild pressure from the European Central Bank [ECB] or the European parliament.

"Rules that were in place about how much debt a country can have and how much of a budget deficit any country can run in any one particular year have largely been ignored and now lack credibility."

None of the rules are working anymore, it seems. In fact, the rules of managing economies have changed drastically. Where this will land the human race — no one knows, including bankers and economists.

Market volatility

The last two weeks have been a rollercoaster ride in the markets. Already concerned about signs of economic weakness, investors have reacted dramatically to the dysfunction in Brussels, Frankfurt and Washington.

European policymakers have responded to their crisis with a series of indecisive measures, including a counter-intuitive tightening of monetary policy by the European Central Bank, said a Bank of America Merill Lynch report.

"Apparently, we are told, raising interest rates can control inflation without hurting growth or financial markets.

"Closer to home, fiscal authorities have bombarded the markets with a quadraphonic message of hopelessness: 1. The US has a huge fiscal problem, 2. They are too dysfunctional to deal with it, 3. Threatening to default on the debt is an acceptable form of negotiation, and 4. We will continue to tighten policy regardless of how the economy is doing," it said.

"Unfortunately, this leaves the Fed in a familiar spot, cleaning up everyone else's mess. Back in 2008, the Fed was left to deal with the emerging financial crisis, while the ECB hiked rates and Congress refused to take any action, until the stock market was in full collapse."

Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, has pointed out that monetary policy cannot solve all of the world's problems.

Moreover, each new round of unconventional policy is likely to have a smaller effect than the last.

"This is particularly the case when the Fed faces a bevy of dissent from both inside and outside the Committee," Ethan S. Harris, Economist at BofA Merill Lynch, said.

Nonetheless, the Fed is not impotent.

However, there are two reasons for concern. First, a number of sectors have yet to recover from the previous crisis. Banks have rebuilt their capital and are in better shape. However, both the housing sector and state and local governments are quite vulnerable. If the economy does go back into recession, it could reignite the negative feedback loop between employment, home prices and mortgage delinquencies, BofA economists argue.

Hope against hope

The best case for a recovery is that the market panic stops and some of the recent shocks fade. Oil prices have already come off their highs and Japanese supply chains are recovering from the impact of the recent earthquake and tsunami. Moreover, while the Fed has no room to cut interest rates, the ECB and most emerging market central banks have room to ease, it says.

"Europe could take the big step of fiscal integration and centralised debt financing—this is the natural end game for the union. Over the longer term, we could see a pickup in foreign investment, a re-opening of immigration to skilled workers and a productivity boom triggered by technological innovation," it says.

While risks are skewed to the downside, the economy will continue to recover slowly.

"The recovery will likely come in fits and starts, and we should not be surprised if there are more dead spots that may feel like a recession.

"We learned from historical episodes that the healing process from a balance sheet recession is slow and often bumpy," Harris says.

How and why did the world get into this huge 'trap'?

To begin with, it is the advanced or developed industrialised countries that have a huge and unsustainable debt problem, says Dr Nasser Saidi, chief economist of Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC).

By contrast, emerging market economies (with few exceptions) have healthy national balance sheets, strong macro-economic conditions and sound fiscal policies.

The OECD forecasts that advanced economies — without major corrective changes in fiscal policies — will have debt to GDP ratios in excess of 115 per cent by 2015.

What led to this growing debt problem?

"We need to distinguish between secular, trend factors that underlie government budget deficits and debt accumulation from cyclical factors and the results of interventionist government policies," says Dr Saidi.

The trend factors are related to the demographics of ageing populations in advanced economies (Japan, Europe and to a lesser extent the US) and the role of entitlement and health policies: social security, national health programmes (Medicare, Medicaid).

The ageing population that characterises Japan, Europe and the US has contributed to the current situation in two ways.

First of all, an uneven growth of working-age and retirement-age population means that a decreasing number of tax-payers have to provide the financial resources for an increasing number of people that become eligible for old-age pensions, he explains.

"There is large transfer of resources from the young to the elderly causing the generation that is entering the job market now to finance not only their own future retirement, but also of their parents. Rather than increase the taxation burden [considered high already in Europe] politicians have taken the easy way out: increased borrowing," he says.

"The political cycle in advanced economies is heavily biased towards running deficits and increasing debt. The related issue is that people are living longer: life expectancy in the advanced economies has increased from an average 71 years in 1970 to 78 years in 2009. This results in higher public [and private] spending on health and medical as well as other entitlements and growing budget deficits."

The cyclical factors relate to the impact of the Great Contraction and the Great Financial Crisis. Recessions typically lead to increased government spending through the operation of automatic fiscal stabilisers (e.g. unemployment benefits) while tax revenues decline as a result of lower income; the result is higher deficit spending and debt accumulation.

This expected deficit increasing cyclical effect was exacerbated by unprecedented fiscal stimulus, bail-outs of banks and financial institutions and the 'socialisation' of private debt, when governments and central banks took over liabilities from insolvent banks and financial institutions and other sectors (e.g. car industry).

"In the US the situation was aggravated by loose monetary and fiscal policies after 2001, leading to both public and private sector dissaving and reversing a string of government budget surpluses from 1998 to 2001 [with a peak in 2000 when the surplus amounted to $236 billion (Dh866.8 billion]," Dr Saidi argues.

"A policy of low interest rates encouraged private sector dissaving and greater household indebtedness [mortgages in particular], while military spending surged in association with wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

"The US moved from being a net capital exporter to a capital importer, absorbing some two thirds of global saving over the period 2004-2006, resulting in the 'global imbalance'."

What is the way out?

There is no easy way out.

Advanced economies will require deep and sweeping reforms to their taxation systems and to their entitlement programmes. Fiscal sustainability requires higher tax rates and the countering of demographic pressures, Dr Saidi says.

"The choices are stark and limited: retirement ages need to be gradually extended to 70 or higher, given increased life expectancy; this should be accompanied by a reduction in the size and coverage of entitlement programmes," he says.

For the US, the long term fiscal sustainability menu will need to include a major reduction in military expenditures and agricultural subsidies. For Europe, dealing with the demographics will also entail loosening of the strict emigration policies in place now: Europe has to draw on the relatively young populations of the Southern Mediterranean in order to pay for its pensions.

None of the above choices are politi cally palatable and we should not expect governments to willingly take hard choices.

"The lessons from history are clear: faced with large debt burdens, governments are unlikely to substantially increase taxation or effect permanent reductions in spending; they are more likely to default or reduce the real value of their obligations through inflation," he says.

To convince their creditors and financial markets, governments will need to invest in credible institutions. Increasingly, governments are turning towards setting up of independent fiscal advisory councils and the adoption of fiscal rules.

"Such fiscal councils should also be adopting new and different ways of looking at governments fiscal accounts. We should move toward 'generational accounting' systems: a method for estimating the economic impact of fiscal policy on different generations — including future ones.

"The idea is to evaluate the intergenerational effects of alternative government fiscal policies," he says.

But Saidi says to keep the economic growth momentum, governments are forced to spend, rather than repay debts.

Modern political systems — in advanced economies predominantly — have a built-in bias to deficit spending. Most spending once instituted is difficult to roll back and raising taxes is not a vote getter, he explained.

"This is exacerbated by the political cycle and short-time horizon of governments and elected politicians: if you are elected for three to four years or you are a government with a short expected lifetime, you will tend to spend, not tax in order to get re-elected or to pass the consequences of your fiscal follies to subsequent governments," he says.

Income disparity

Of the global population, nearly half or 3.25 billion earn less than $2 (Dh7.3) a day, whereas the number of millionaires has obly crossed ten million — reflecting a widening wealth gap that could threaten social stability.

According to the latest World Wealth Report by Merill Lynch and Capgemini, the population of global high networth individuals (HNWI) increased 8.3 per cent last year to 10.9 million and HNWI financial wealth grew 9.7 per cent to reach $42.7 trillion. The global population of Ultra-HNWIs grew by 10.2 per cent in 2010 and its wealth by 11.5 per cent.

"In its beginnings, the credit system sneaks in as a modest helper of accumulation and draws by invisible threads the money resources scattered all over the surface of society into the hands of individual or associated capitalists.

"But soon it becomes a new and formidable weapon in the competitive struggle, and finally it transforms itself into an immense social mechanism for the centralisation of capital."

However, the rising debt toll is becoming the single biggest headache for governments and economists worldwide and is gradually reaching a point where no one can protect humans from 'insolvency'. The Arab spring is a reminder of how things can flare up if not dealt with properly.

Full Bernanke Speech: Nothing Now, But Wait For Sept 20 FOMC…

Bottom line: nothing now, QE3 now expected to be delivered Sept. 20? or not…

  • BERNANKE SAYS FED HAS LIMITED ABILITY TO ENSURE LONG-RUN GROWTH
  • BERNANKE DOESN'T SIGNAL NEW STEPS FOR PROMOTING U.S. GROWTH
  • BERNANKE SAYS EXTRA DAY TO ALLOW `FULLER DISCUSSION' OF TOOLS
  • BERNANKE SAYS FED TO EXTEND SEPT. FOMC MEETING TO TWO DAYS
  • BERNANKE SAYS FED HAS `RANGE OF TOOLS' FOR STIMULATING GROWTH
  • BERNANKE SAYS `FINANCIAL STRESS' WILL BE A `DRAG' ON RECOVERY

The Near- and Longer-Term Prospects for the U.S. Economy

Good morning. As always, thanks are due to the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City for organizing this conference. This year's topic, long-term economic growth, is indeed pertinent–as has so often been the case at this symposium in past years. In particular, the financial crisis and the subsequent slow recovery have caused some to question whether the United States, notwithstanding its long-term record of vigorous economic growth, might not now be facing a prolonged period of stagnation, regardless of its public policy choices. Might not the very slow pace of economic expansion of the past few years, not only in the United States but also in a number of other advanced economies, morph into something far more long-lasting?

I can certainly appreciate these concerns and am fully aware of the challenges that we face in restoring economic and financial conditions conducive to healthy growth, some of which I will comment on today. With respect to longer-run prospects, however, my own view is more optimistic. As I will discuss, although important problems certainly exist, the growth fundamentals of the United States do not appear to have been permanently altered by the shocks of the past four years. It may take some time, but we can reasonably expect to see a return to growth rates and employment levels consistent with those underlying fundamentals. In the interim, however, the challenges for U.S. economic policymakers are twofold: first, to help our economy further recover from the crisis and the ensuing recession, and second, to do so in a way that will allow the economy to realize its longer-term growth potential. Economic policies should be evaluated in light of both of those objectives.

This morning I will offer some thoughts on why the pace of recovery in the United States has, for the most part, proved disappointing thus far, and I will discuss the Federal Reserve's policy response. I will then turn briefly to the longer-term prospects of our economy and the need for our country's economic policies to be effective from both a shorter-term and longer-term perspective.

Near-Term Prospects for the Economy and Policy
In discussing the prospects for the economy and for policy in the near term, it bears recalling briefly how we got here. The financial crisis that gripped global markets in 2008 and 2009 was more severe than any since the Great Depression. Economic policymakers around the world saw the mounting risks of a global financial meltdown in the fall of 2008 and understood the extraordinarily dire economic consequences that such an event could have. As I have described in previous remarks at this forum, governments and central banks worked forcefully and in close coordination to avert the looming collapse. The actions to stabilize the financial system were accompanied, both in the United States and abroad, by substantial monetary and fiscal stimulus. But notwithstanding these strong and concerted efforts, severe damage to the global economy could not be avoided. The freezing of credit, the sharp drops in asset prices, dysfunction in financial markets, and the resulting blows to confidence sent global production and trade into free fall in late 2008 and early 2009.

We meet here today almost exactly three years since the beginning of the most intense phase of the financial crisis and a bit more than two years since the National Bureau of Economic Research's date for the start of the economic recovery. Where do we stand?

There have been some positive developments over the past few years, particularly when considered in the light of economic prospects as viewed at the depth of the crisis. Overall, the global economy has seen significant growth, led by the emerging-market economies. In the United States, a cyclical recovery, though a modest one by historical standards, is in its ninth quarter. In the financial sphere, the U.S. banking system is generally much healthier now, with banks holding substantially more capital. Credit availability from banks has improved, though it remains tight in categories–such as small business lending–in which the balance sheets of potential borrowers remain impaired. Companies with access to the public bond markets have had no difficulty obtaining credit on favorable terms. Importantly, structural reform is moving forward in the financial sector, with ambitious domestic and international efforts underway to enhance the capital and liquidity of banks, especially the most systemically important banks; to improve risk management and transparency; to strengthen market infrastructure; and to introduce a more systemic, or macroprudential, approach to financial regulation and supervision.

In the broader economy, manufacturing production in the United States has risen nearly 15 percent since its trough, driven substantially by growth in exports. Indeed, the U.S. trade deficit has been notably lower recently than it was before the crisis, reflecting in part the improved competitiveness of U.S. goods and services. Business investment in equipment and software has continued to expand, and productivity gains in some industries have been impressive, though new data have reduced estimates of overall productivity improvement in recent years. Households also have made some progress in repairing their balance sheets–saving more, borrowing less, and reducing their burdens of interest payments and debt. Commodity prices have come off their highs, which will reduce the cost pressures facing businesses and help increase household purchasing power.

Notwithstanding these more positive developments, however, it is clear that the recovery from the crisis has been much less robust than we had hoped. From the latest comprehensive revisions to the national accounts as well as the most recent estimates of growth in the first half of this year, we have learned that the recession was even deeper and the recovery even weaker than we had thought; indeed, aggregate output in the United States still has not returned to the level that it attained before the crisis. Importantly, economic growth has for the most part been at rates insufficient to achieve sustained reductions in unemployment, which has recently been fluctuating a bit above 9 percent. Temporary factors, including the effects of the run-up in commodity prices on consumer and business budgets and the effect of the Japanese disaster on global supply chains and production, were part of the reason for the weak performance of the economy in the first half of 2011; accordingly, growth in the second half looks likely to improve as their influence recedes. However, the incoming data suggest that other, more persistent factors also have been at work.

Why has the recovery from the crisis been so slow and erratic? Historically, recessions have typically sowed the seeds of their own recoveries as reduced spending on investment, housing, and consumer durables generates pent-up demand. As the business cycle bottoms out and confidence returns, this pent-up demand, often augmented by the effects of stimulative monetary and fiscal policies, is met through increased production and hiring. Increased production in turn boosts business revenues and household incomes and provides further impetus to business and household spending. Improving income prospects and balance sheets also make households and businesses more creditworthy, and financial institutions become more willing to lend. Normally, these developments create a virtuous circle of rising incomes and profits, more supportive financial and credit conditions, and lower uncertainty, allowing the process of recovery to develop momentum.

These restorative forces are at work today, and they will continue to promote recovery over time. Unfortunately, the recession, besides being extraordinarily severe as well as global in scope, was also unusual in being associated with both a very deep slump in the housing market and a historic financial crisis. These two features of the downturn, individually and in combination, have acted to slow the natural recovery process.

Notably, the housing sector has been a significant driver of recovery from most recessions in the United States since World War II, but this time–with an overhang of distressed and foreclosed properties, tight credit conditions for builders and potential homebuyers, and ongoing concerns by both potential borrowers and lenders about continued house price declines–the rate of new home construction has remained at less than one-third of its pre-crisis level. The low level of construction has implications not only for builders but for providers of a wide range of goods and services related to housing and homebuilding. Moreover, even as tight credit for some borrowers has been one of the factors restraining housing recovery, the weakness of the housing sector has in turn had adverse effects on financial markets and on the flow of credit. For example, the sharp declines in house prices in some areas have left many homeowners "underwater" on their mortgages, creating financial hardship for households and, through their effects on rates of mortgage delinquency and default, stress for financial institutions as well. Financial pressures on financial institutions and households have contributed, in turn, to greater caution in the extension of credit and to slower growth in consumer spending.

I have already noted the central role of the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 in sparking the recession. As I also noted, a great deal has been done and is being done to address the causes and effects of the crisis, including a substantial program of financial reform, and conditions in the U.S. banking system and financial markets have improved significantly overall. Nevertheless, financial stress has been and continues to be a significant drag on the recovery, both here and abroad. Bouts of sharp volatility and risk aversion in markets have recently re-emerged in reaction to concerns about both European sovereign debts and developments related to the U.S. fiscal situation, including the recent downgrade of the U.S. long-term credit rating by one of the major rating agencies and the controversy concerning the raising of the U.S. federal debt ceiling. It is difficult to judge by how much these developments have affected economic activity thus far, but there seems little doubt that they have hurt household and business confidence and that they pose ongoing risks to growth. The Federal Reserve continues to monitor developments in financial markets and institutions closely and is in frequent contact with policymakers in Europe and elsewhere.

Monetary policy must be responsive to changes in the economy and, in particular, to the outlook for growth and inflation. As I mentioned earlier, the recent data have indicated that economic growth during the first half of this year was considerably slower than the Federal Open Market Committee had been expecting, and that temporary factors can account for only a portion of the economic weakness that we have observed. Consequently, although we expect a moderate recovery to continue and indeed to strengthen over time, the Committee has marked down its outlook for the likely pace of growth over coming quarters. With commodity prices and other import prices moderating and with longer-term inflation expectations remaining stable, we expect inflation to settle, over coming quarters, at levels at or below the rate of 2 percent, or a bit less, that most Committee participants view as being consistent with our dual mandate.

In light of its current outlook, the Committee recently decided to provide more specific forward guidance about its expectations for the future path of the federal funds rate. In particular, in the statement following our meeting earlier this month, we indicated that economic conditions–including low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run–are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through mid-2013. That is, in what the Committee judges to be the most likely scenarios for resource utilization and inflation in the medium term, the target for the federal funds rate would be held at its current low levels for at least two more years.

In addition to refining our forward guidance, the Federal Reserve has a range of tools that could be used to provide additional monetary stimulus. We discussed the relative merits and costs of such tools at our August meeting. We will continue to consider those and other pertinent issues, including of course economic and financial developments, at our meeting in September, which has been scheduled for two days (the 20th and the 21st) instead of one to allow a fuller discussion. The Committee will continue to assess the economic outlook in light of incoming information and is prepared to employ its tools as appropriate to promote a stronger economic recovery in a context of price stability.

Economic Policy and Longer-Term Growth in the United States
The financial crisis and its aftermath have posed severe challenges around the globe, particularly in the advanced industrial economies. Thus far I have reviewed some of those challenges, offered some diagnoses for the slow economic recovery in the United States, and briefly discussed the policy response by the Federal Reserve. However, this conference is focused on longer-run economic growth, and appropriately so, given the fundamental importance of long-term growth rates in the determination of living standards. In that spirit, let me turn now to a brief discussion of the longer-run prospects for the U.S. economy and the role of economic policy in shaping those prospects.

Notwithstanding the severe difficulties we currently face, I do not expect the long-run growth potential of the U.S. economy to be materially affected by the crisis and the recession if–and I stress if–our country takes the necessary steps to secure that outcome. Over the medium term, housing activity will stabilize and begin to grow again, if for no other reason than that ongoing population growth and household formation will ultimately demand it. Good, proactive housing policies could help speed that process. Financial markets and institutions have already made considerable progress toward normalization, and I anticipate that the financial sector will continue to adapt to ongoing reforms while still performing its vital intermediation functions. Households will continue to strengthen their balance sheets, a process that will be sped up considerably if the recovery accelerates but that will move forward in any case. Businesses will continue to invest in new capital, adopt new technologies, and build on the productivity gains of the past several years. I have confidence that our European colleagues fully appreciate what is at stake in the difficult issues they are now confronting and that, over time, they will take all necessary and appropriate steps to address those issues effectively and comprehensively.

This economic healing will take a while, and there may be setbacks along the way. Moreover, we will need to remain alert to risks to the recovery, including financial risks. However, with one possible exception on which I will elaborate in a moment, the healing process should not leave major scars. Notwithstanding the trauma of the crisis and the recession, the U.S. economy remains the largest in the world, with a highly diverse mix of industries and a degree of international competitiveness that, if anything, has improved in recent years. Our economy retains its traditional advantages of a strong market orientation, a robust entrepreneurial culture, and flexible capital and labor markets. And our country remains a technological leader, with many of the world's leading research universities and the highest spending on research and development of any nation.

Of course, the United States faces many growth challenges. Our population is aging, like those of many other advanced economies, and our society will have to adapt over time to an older workforce. Our K-12 educational system, despite considerable strengths, poorly serves a substantial portion of our population. The costs of health care in the United States are the highest in the world, without fully commensurate results in terms of health outcomes. But all of these long-term issues were well known before the crisis; efforts to address these problems have been ongoing, and these efforts will continue and, I hope, intensify.

The quality of economic policymaking in the United States will heavily influence the nation's longer-term prospects. To allow the economy to grow at its full potential, policymakers must work to promote macroeconomic and financial stability; adopt effective tax, trade, and regulatory policies; foster the development of a skilled workforce; encourage productive investment, both private and public; and provide appropriate support for research and development and for the adoption of new technologies.

The Federal Reserve has a role in promoting the longer-term performance of the economy. Most importantly, monetary policy that ensures that inflation remains low and stable over time contributes to long-run macroeconomic and financial stability. Low and stable inflation improves the functioning of markets, making them more effective at allocating resources; and it allows households and businesses to plan for the future without having to be unduly concerned with unpredictable movements in the general level of prices. The Federal Reserve also fosters macroeconomic and financial stability in its role as a financial regulator, a monitor of overall financial stability, and a liquidity provider of last resort.

Normally, monetary or fiscal policies aimed primarily at promoting a faster pace of economic recovery in the near term would not be expected to significantly affect the longer-term performance of the economy. However, current circumstances may be an exception to that standard view–the exception to which I alluded earlier. Our economy is suffering today from an extraordinarily high level of long-term unemployment, with nearly half of the unemployed having been out of work for more than six months. Under these unusual circumstances, policies that promote a stronger recovery in the near term may serve longer-term objectives as well. In the short term, putting people back to work reduces the hardships inflicted by difficult economic times and helps ensure that our economy is producing at its full potential rather than leaving productive resources fallow. In the longer term, minimizing the duration of unemployment supports a healthy economy by avoiding some of the erosion of skills and loss of attachment to the labor force that is often associated with long-term unemployment.

Notwithstanding this observation, which adds urgency to the need to achieve a cyclical recovery in employment, most of the economic policies that support robust economic growth in the long run are outside the province of the central bank. We have heard a great deal lately about federal fiscal policy in the United States, so I will close with some thoughts on that topic, focusing on the role of fiscal policy in promoting stability and growth.

To achieve economic and financial stability, U.S. fiscal policy must be placed on a sustainable path that ensures that debt relative to national income is at least stable or, preferably, declining over time. As I have emphasized on previous occasions, without significant policy changes, the finances of the federal government will inevitably spiral out of control, risking severe economic and financial damage. The increasing fiscal burden that will be associated with the aging of the population and the ongoing rise in the costs of health care make prompt and decisive action in this area all the more critical.

Although the issue of fiscal sustainability must urgently be addressed, fiscal policymakers should not, as a consequence, disregard the fragility of the current economic recovery. Fortunately, the two goals of achieving fiscal sustainability–which is the result of responsible policies set in place for the longer term–and avoiding the creation of fiscal headwinds for the current recovery are not incompatible. Acting now to put in place a credible plan for reducing future deficits over the longer term, while being attentive to the implications of fiscal choices for the recovery in the near term, can help serve both objectives.

Fiscal policymakers can also promote stronger economic performance through the design of tax policies and spending programs. To the fullest extent possible, our nation's tax and spending policies should increase incentives to work and to save, encourage investments in the skills of our workforce, stimulate private capital formation, promote research and development, and provide necessary public infrastructure. We cannot expect our economy to grow its way out of our fiscal imbalances, but a more productive economy will ease the tradeoffs that we face.

Finally, and perhaps most challenging, the country would be well served by a better process for making fiscal decisions. The negotiations that took place over the summer disrupted financial markets and probably the economy as well, and similar events in the future could, over time, seriously jeopardize the willingness of investors around the world to hold U.S. financial assets or to make direct investments in job-creating U.S. businesses. Although details would have to be negotiated, fiscal policymakers could consider developing a more effective process that sets clear and transparent budget goals, together with budget mechanisms to establish the credibility of those goals. Of course, formal budget goals and mechanisms do not replace the need for fiscal policymakers to make the difficult choices that are needed to put the country's fiscal house in order, which means that public understanding of and support for the goals of fiscal policy are crucial.

Economic policymakers face a range of difficult decisions, relating to both the short-run and long-run challenges we face. I have no doubt, however, that those challenges can be met, and that the fundamental strengths of our economy will ultimately reassert themselves. The Federal Reserve will certainly do all that it can to help restore high rates of growth and employment in a context of price stability.

FII monthly outflow nears 3-year high at Rs 11,222 crore

As sentiments continue to turn from bad to worse, the outflow of foreign institutional investments from Indian equity has gathered momentum and has hit a near three-year high for the month of August. The net outflow for the month of August reached Rs 11,222 crore — the highest since October 2008, post the Lehman collapse when the net outflow was at Rs 15,347 crore.

 The net inflow for the calendar 2011 also turned flat and on Friday the net investment stood at (-) Rs 502 crore for the calendar 2011 as against Rs 133,264 crore in the calendar 2010.

The FII participation has a strong co-relation with the Indian equity market performance. With the outflow of FII money to the tune of Rs 11,222 crore in the month of August, the Sensex at the Bombay Stock Exchange in the same period has fallen by 12.9 percent.

On Friday alone the net FII outflow stood at Rs 1,494 crore and the Sensex fell by 1.8 percent.

Experts say that there is a feeling of general risk aversion in the market and the money coming back in the short-term is unlikely.

FII's have grown even more wary of the Indian markets since the Reserve Bank of India went for an unexpected 50 basis point hike in the repo rate in July.